This article presents a theoretical criticism of current approaches to the study of 
Introduction '
The variety of behaviors that we group under the label communication can range from the simplest iconic display to the most complex forms of human interaction. Not surprisingly, this subject has attracted the interest of a heterogenous group of disciplines, ranging from evolutionary biology and ethology to psychology, psychotherapy, sociology, philosophy of language, epistemology, and media studies, among others. This diversity suggests an immediate question about the actual degree of relatedness of similarly labeled corresponding subjects of these disciplines. It The aim of this work is twofold. The first half of this article (sections 2 and 3) tackles some of the theoretical difficulties of defining communication by providing a critical analysis of the use of the beneficial-exchange-of-information metaphor. I will claim that this metaphor achieves very little in disclosing the basic nature of the phenomenon of communication. I also will introduce an alternative theoretical understanding of this subject based on the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980) , an understanding whose roots can also be found in certain works on cybernetics, psychotherapy, pragmatic philosophy of language, and phenomenology.
To show the benefits arising from the adoption of this focus, the second half of this article (sections 4 through 6) presents an investigation into the evolution of nonrecursive coordination and coordination of recursive actions by proposing a mathematical and a computational model for the evolution of a population of agents playing an interactional game. The choice of this game is guided by the wish to maintain certain continuity of language and tools with more traditional approaches. An extended game-theoretical account of the problem will show that evolutionary dynamics do not necessarily reach an equilibrium that we may identify as a stable strategy, justifying, therefore, further modeling in order to consider more intervening factors, such as spatiality and asynchronicity. A good framework for this task will prove to be a direct computational modeling of the same process.
The results of these investigations will show that coordinated activity evolves in cases that cannot be accounted for in the traditional view but fall naturally within the alternative understanding of the phenomenon presented here. The relevance of these results for an investigation of the origin and evolution of natural communication is discussed in the last section of this article.
Preconceptions About Communication
In most studies of the evolution of communication ( (Stolzenberg, 1984) . It would be, however, a mistake to think that any preconception is necessarily a misconception. The latter has to do with how well our ideas fit into the world of our experience, whereas the former refers to an almost necessary consequence of any scientific activity.
Preconceptions have obvious repercussions for research. Not only do they shape the way in which specific questions are addressed, but they also constrain the range of questions that it is sensible to ask. We tend to rely blindly on them, and their very distinction demands an effort in self-reflective questioning of one's own methodology. It is my purpose in this section to analyze briefly two important preconceptions about the evolution of communication.
The role of selection
A preconception frequently found in definitions emerging from behavioral ecology is that communicative behavior is necessarily beneficial for some of the participants (at least probabilistically); otherwise, natural selection would not have favored it. Wilson (1975) defines communication as the altering by one organism of the probability pattern of behavior in another organism in a manner adaptive to either one of them or to both. Lewis and Gower (1980, p. 2) define communication as &dquo;the transmission of signals between two or more organisms where selection has favoured both the production and reception of the signal(s).&dquo; Krebs and Davies (1993, p. 349) define it as the &dquo;process in which actors use specially designed signals or displays to modify the behaviour or a reactor.&dquo; They later make clear that they understand &dquo;specially designed signals&dquo; as those that have been favored by natural selection (Krebs & Davies, 1993) . Burghardt (1970; MacLennan & Burghardt, 1994, p. 163) defines it as a behavior that is &dquo;likely to influence the receiver in a way that benefits, in a probabilistic manner, the signaller or some group of which it is a member.&dquo; Maynard-Smith and Harper (1995, p. 306) define a signal &dquo;as an action or structure that increases the fitness of an individual by altering the behaviours of other organisms detecting it, and that has characteristics that have evolved because they have that effect.&dquo;
All these definitions are questionable on simple methodological grounds: They mix a characterization of the phenomenon with a possible (and, admittedly, plausible) 
Signals and information
Another preconception about communication that often is found in the biology literature is that it involves operationally the transmission of information from a sender to a receiver. This is an understandably popular view in our age of mass media, fax machines, and computer networks. Information is a concept that has penetrated our understanding of developmental processes (Oyama, 1985) Shannon's (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) are not really about our everyday idea of information; they are about the &dquo;reliable transmission of signals over unreliable channels&dquo; (von Foerster, 1980) . These theories can account only for content-free, uncertainty-reducing mechanisms, as the authors themselves make clear. Information, as they present it, is a probabilistic concept that has little to do with the kind of information that often is invoked when describing communicative behavior (Oyama, 1985) . Though there have been interesting attempts to define our more colloquial understanding of informationsuch as the &dquo;difference that makes the difference&dquo; to someone (Bateson, 1972) or the appearance of dependency in otherwise independent systems in a given time frame (Holt, 1972; Pask, 1980) (Maturana & Varela, 1980) , although similar ideas have been expressed, sometimes in different terms, in the field of cybernetics (von Foerster, 1980; Pask, 1976 Pask, , 1980 and in certain branches of psychology and family therapy (Bateson, 1972; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1968) and sociocognitive development (Fogel, 1993) . From a philosophical perspective, many otherwise different traditions, both pragmatical and phenomenological, converge into similar views (Austin, 1962; Dewey, 1958; Habermas, 1979; Heidegger, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1963) . It is, however, far beyond the scope of this section to give a thorough introduction to autopoietic theory, and so the reader is referred to Maturana and Varela (1980, 1988) (Varela, 1979 (Maturana & Varela, 1988) . It is important to notice that all the activity in a consensual domain is, by nature, recursive in the sense that changes of state in an individual are built on previous changes of state in the same individual and other coparticipants. However, this is not to be confused with the idea of recursion on already existing coordinations. In this special case, the activity being coordinated is itself a coordination of actions, which must be understood as a different sort of recursion. This coordination of coordination of behaviors is identified as a defining characteristic of the phenomenon of &dquo;languaging&dquo; (Maturana, 1978) (Zeeman, 1980) Table 2 Effective components (A, B) versus perceived signal source. Agents playing the first role will emit one of two possible signals given the perceived food type. Accordingly, they may emit a or 6 when the food source requires action A or they may emit 13 or -y when the food source requires action B. As a further constraint, cx-emitters will also be (3-emitters, and 6-emitters will also be qemitters. We will not consider mixed strategies. The agents playing the second role will act in accordance with the signal received and their own structure, some of them performing actions A or B when detecting a or (3 and a nonrelevant action in other cases, and some of them acting correspondingly when detecting 6 or -Y. Tables 1 and  2 show the behavior of the four possible types of agents in this scenario. In Table 1 This cyclical dynamic can be seen to follow many other initial conditions, and no other attractor has been observed. In Figure 2 , we can see the shape of this periodic attractor in the space P1 -P3 -P4. For this sort of cycle to occur, the number of possible strategies must be greater than two. Naturally occurring examples have recently been found in mating strategies in male side-blotched lizards (Sinervo & Lively, 1996 Table 4 ). Agents playing the second role will act according only to the perceived external manifestation of the actions of the first Table 4 Example of behavioral matrix player and on the base hypothesis that the food is type FO (this means their actions will be encoded in the first row of the matrix). Correspondingly, the actions of the first player will depend only on the perceived food type and on the base hypothesis that they perceive an external manifestation a (their actions will be encoded in the first column of the matrix). Although only one column and one row of the behavioral matrix are used, the matrix representation is retained for games involving more interactive steps (see section 6).
The behavioral matrix is encoded in a haploid genome, represented by a binary bitstring. Offspring receive their genome as the result of a uniform crossover operation on their parents' genotypes, plus certain probability of mutation per place. This is a satisfying scheme in which selection acts negatively. There is no fitness function to optimize; likewise, there are no special rewards or punishments for behaving in a specific way apart from the rules of the game. A problem derived from the use of this scheme is the lack of obvious measures of evolution. Many variables were monitored-the size of the population, the amount of instantaneous environmental energy, the average number of offspring, and the like-but, for our purposes, the simplest way to monitor the evolution of action coordination is to look at changes in the average activity success of the first and second players and at the average success in coordinated activity and at correlations among all these.
Evolution of coordination
Results discussed in this section were obtained using two , and 100% corresponds to c = 0.5-that is, no cost against commumcation; the line between 80% and 90% corresponds to c = 0.55; the one between 60% and 70% to c = 0.6; and the one between 50% and 60% to c = 0.65. Values of c equal to or greater than 0.7 result in a level of 50%, which is the baseline case for this game.
Spatiotemporal structures
A simple inspection of the resulting data in all simulations shows that the individual history of coordination success can differ significantly from agent to agent and from the value of R 12 at that time. For instance, groups of agents achieving 90 percent of coordination success can coexist with other groups that achieve 60 percent, both in a stable state during the same simulation run. Even though an individual historical average is qualitatively different from an instantaneous population average, one would expect the resulting numbers to differ little, especially if R 12 has been stable for some time. The results suggest that there may be some structure in the population that prevents the homogenizing effects of sexual reproduction.
5.3.1 I Cluster formation and stability Figure 5 shows the first stages in the evolution of agent spatial distribution. Initially, agents are distributed randomly across the whole of the environment (border effects have been avoided by the use of periodic boundary conditions). We can observe how this initial symmetry is broken rapidly and how agents show a tendency to aggregate into clusters. Symmetry breaking is caused by minor differences in the initial distribution in positions and also by the updating rules; so that some agents will be more successful than others just because they have a few more agents with which to interact or have been called to act a few more times and, therefore, have a slightly greater chance of accumulating enough energy for reproduction. As reproduction is also a local process, the effect is self-reinforcing. Relatively isolated agents will have less chance of interacting and will tend to die sooner, also contributing positively to an increase in the isolation of agents in similar positions.
Unfortunately, cluster formation mechanisms do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the reasons for clusters remaining more or less stable structures, as is generally observed. Why do they not expand or shrink or break or fuse? The fact is that these behaviors have been observed, but they are the exception rather than the rule, and they can be explained once an understanding of the general case of cluster quasistability is achieved. Figure 6 Energy and population distribution inside and around a cluster (circle) ' Tendency to Expand Figure 6 shows a qualitative model of a typically observed distribution of environmental energy and density of agents inside and in the vicinity of a cluster. It is easy to see that resources will be more frequently used in more populated areas toward the center of the cluster than on peripheral areas in which the population is sparser, so that the amount of available energy will, on average, decrease toward the center, as is shown in the figure. Agents living in the periphery will have access to resources of greater quality, and the average energy gained per game played will be greater than that of agents in the center region. Hence, at first glance, peripheral agents would seem to be better off and to have a better chance of generating more offspring; therefore, the cluster would experience a tendency toward expansion. , , Tendency to Collapse In contrast, though all agents have the same probability of being chosen to play the first role in the game, the frequency with which an agent actually plays the game depends on the surrounding population density. The more densely populated the area, the higher is the chance of finding a partner with which to play. For this reason, agents living near the center of a cluster will play the game more frequently. Moreover, the probability of an agent playing the second role also depends on its position within the cluster. Given that certain regions of an agent's neighborhood will be more densely populated than others, second players will be chosen more frequently from those regions. As a result of the circular geometry of the cluster and of the increasing density of agents toward its center, agents in this particular region will benefit from this effect in a cumulative way and will, on average, play the second role more times than they play the first role. Conversely, agents living near the periphery will be chosen less frequently for playing the second role because their distribution is sparser and, therefore, they will, on average, play the first role more times than the second role. The ratio (frequency as second player/frequency as first player) has been observed to range from a minimum of 0.9 at the periphery to a maximum of 1.25 at the center of the cluster. In short, agents living in the populated areas near the center (1) will play the game more frequently than agents living in sparse areas and (2) will perform the second role more frequently than the first role. Therefore, in principle, they will stand a better chance of receiving (by coordination, or just by guessing) more energy per unit of time. This provides the cluster with a tendency to collapse.
Equilibrium The equilibrium of both these tendencies determines the size of the quasistable cluster. At a certain size, the extra energy gained by the peripheral subpopulation will match the energy lost by their being more sparsely distributed than the center subpopulation. Selection Ideally, this situation would be resolved by having two distinct subpopulations-one of (almost) total coordinating agents in the center of the cluster and one of total noncoordinating agents in the periphery-but this is not possible owing to the genetic homogeneity within a cluster. Given that the sizes of each subpopulation are comparable and that a newborn agent has comparable probabilities of being placed in either of the two regions, then there is no ground for selection to be very specific about which of the extreme behaviors to choose. Therefore, surviving agents will tend to be able to satisfy partially the conditions of both extreme environmental conditions and, consequently, they will necessarily possess the ability to coordinate their actions up to a certain level, which will depend on the parameter c.
Thus, the evolution of coordinated activity in this model can be explained by the interplay of spatiotemporal constraints and selective mechanisms. the relation between the components of this explanation.
An alternative explanation could be attempted in terms of the mechanism of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964 Figure 7 . The explanation is achieved by examining the effects on the distribution of environmental energy and, consequently, on the distribution of agents if coordinated activity in a cluster increases by a small amount. The same qualitative model that was presented in Figure 6 is used. Details are presented elsewhere (Di Paolo, 1996 Table 5 would show an example of two agents successfully coordinating their behaviors in This game has a more dialogical structure, and it resembles the kind of interaction described by von Foerster's eigen-behaviors (von Foerster, 1977 (von Foerster, , 1980 An explanation of the formation and quasistability of clusters was advanced in terms of a qualitative model of the observed distribution of population and environmental energy in the region occupied by a cluster. In exploring certain issues arising from this model, many of the observed phenomena (e.g., genetic homogeneity, differences of environmental conditions, and the evolution of action coordination even in the presence of individual costs against it) were able to be explained.
The role of spatiality in the evolution of cooperation has been identified previously (Axelrod, 1984; Ackley & Littman, 1994; Oliphant, 1994) . Although the details of the respective models present important differences, the conclusions are very similar to those reached in this work. However, explanations for these similarities have relied, somewhat loosely, on the mechanism of kin selection (Ackley & Littman, 1994) . Though this mechanism may play an important role in other cases, it was proven that this is not so in the current case.
Similar conclusions have been arrived at in another context (Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991) , which work looks at the role of spatial self-structuring occurring in the prebiotic evolution of catalytic cyclical ensembles (hypercycles). Mathematical (Sawaguchi & Kudo, 1990; Dunbar, 1992) . It has been suggested that language evolution has been deeply influenced by the growth in group size in humans as compared with other primates, and a functionalist explanation was advanced in terms of the role of language as a bonding mechanism in the maintenance of stability in large groups (Dunbar, 1993) . The way that the analogous correlation was explained in the present study is rather different, more in terms of structural dynamics and feedback mechanisms than in terms of functional adaptations. Nevertheless, the parallel is worth noting.
The evolution of dialogical activity, such as the game presented in section 6, brings into question a very important aspect of communication as recursive coordination of actions that has not been explored in detail in this article: that of the relation of the evolution of communication and the evolution of cognitive abilities. Much could be said about this, but the present work cannot penetrate much farther into this area.
These experiments can only be considered as a metaphor that suggests a possible way of understanding the evolution of cognition as rooted in social interactions. If social coordinated activity leads to more complex cognitive achievements, as we saw they can in a very simple model, a speculation could be forwarded about two possible paths for cognitive evolution. One of them would lead roughly to highly structured societies of organisms in which the complexity of the social action involves the whole in such a way that individual behaviors have become more and more specialized, rigid, and subordinated to it (e.g., insect societies). The other would lead to a process of plastic or phylogenic assimilation of certain social modes of behavior in individual organisms, possibly leading, in turn, to higher complexity both in individual and social action. This latter path was very much discussed by Baldwin (1896) as a case of social heredity in gregarious animals. Interestingly enough, in the case of humans, this is how Vygotsky's theory of cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1978 (Vygotsky, , 1988 
